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MR. DEUTSCH:
To be required to introduce, in four minutes, such an outstanding world
authority on the law of treaties as your speaker, is much like a requirement
for a brief description of the universe with at least two examples.
In the first place, in acting as our country's diplomatic master mariner in
piloting to a conclusion, on the 23rd day of May, 1969, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties among the Jus-Cogens shoals of
emerging peremptory norms which beset it on all sides, your speaker
displayed the inestimable value of travaux pre'paratoires.
When, less than a year ago, he brought his project, ex proprio vigore, out
of the status quo ante into a new international era, he did so by a diplo-
matic triumph among representatives of more than a hundred states-a res
nova in the history of multi-lateral negotiations among nations.
Within the past twenty-four hours, your speaker signed this new treaty
in behalf of the United States of America at the headquarters of the United
Nations.
But he had already entered into an over-weaning tri-partite convention
with the American Society of International Law and the Section of In-
ternational and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association, to
deliver, on this occasion, a dissertation on the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.
There having arisen no rebus sic stantibus to justify his withdrawal from
this latter commitment, I take the liberty of reminding him that he is
obliged, under the age-old principle of pacta sunt servanda, codified in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention itself, to perform his obligation to us
in good faith.
Accordingly, I now call upon the Honorable Richard D. Kearney, Am-
bassador in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State of
the United States, to address you.
*Member, International Law Commission and Chairman, United States Delegation to
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties.
t This address was delivered before the joint luncheon of the American Society of
International Law and the Section of International and Comparative Law, Waldorf-Astoria
Hotel, New York, 25 April, 1970. Ambassador Kearney was introduced by Eberhard P.
Deutsch, Editor-in-Chief of THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
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AMBASSADOR KEARNEY:
Few areas of human activity are so freighted with uncertainty as calci'-
lation of the long-term value of contemporary events. Could we have
found, even among the Athenians, one who would have said that Alexan-
der's destruction of the Achaemenian empire was a lesser event than his
tutor's founding the Lyceum? Did any rash serjeant-at-law hazard the view
in the Thirteenth Century that the Second Statute of Westminister' was the
crowning accomplishment of Edward the First?
A myriad of similar examples should be an adequate deterrent to specu-
lation on the part that the Convention on the Law of Treaties 2 may play
upon the international scene or what effect it may have upon the history of
our times. Nonetheless there are a few omens which indicate that adoption
of the treaty on treaties may be an event of importance in the development
of international law and of international relations.
The first pointer is subject matter. Lord McNair's 1930 description of
the treaty as "the only and sadly overworked instrument with which
international society is equipped for the purpose of carrying out its multi-
farious transactions"' 3 remains true forty years later. The creation of a
hundred new international organizations since World War II to supply
organized channels for the conduct of international relations, has, para-
doxically, stimulated rather than reduced, recourse to the treaty. Tenny-
son's vision of the "Parliament of man, the Federation of the world" 4
remains as poetic a fancy as it was when Locksley Hall was written. For
the foreseeable future, the international agreement will remain in Charles
de Visscher's phrase "the essential regulator of international life, the prin-
cipal instrument of the stability and adaptation of law."'5 The corollary is
obvious. The codification of treaty law is a core element in the devel-
opment of international law.
A second guide to the long-term significance of the Treaties Convention
is full-scale participation by the new nations in its development. A total of
110 states sent delegations to the Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties. Of these, forty-one came from countries that have become in-
dependent after World War II. The view is commonplace in these states
that international law of the past was developed by rich and strong states to
justify imperialist activities against small and weak states.
'13 Edw. I. St. 1.
24 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 172-203. The Convention was signed on behalf of the
United States on April 24, 1970. (Department of State press release No. 13 1).
3The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, I 1 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L. L. 101
(1930); reprinted McNair, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961), 739, 740.
41. 127.
5THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rev. ed. 1968) 253.
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A rather trenchant expression of this position was put forward by the
representative of Ghana in the United Nations Sixth Committee, who
pointed out "that most African countries had been colonized as a result of
'gin-bottle' treaties concluded between African chiefs and the colonial
powers, which, whenever it suited them to do so, elevated those treaties to
the status of solemn international agreements or reminded their luckless
partners that the agreements which they had thus concluded had no stand-
ing in international law."6
The interventions in the Sixth Committee preliminary to the Vienna
Conference, however, made it clear that these new nations in general
supported the seventy-five draft articles prepared by the International Law
Commission on the Law of Treaties. In fact, a persistent problem at the
1968 and 1969 sessions of the Conference was the reluctance displaced by
many members of the Asian-African group to accept changes in the Com-
mission's draft articles. Technical suggestions for improvement were often
greeted with as much suspicion as were proposals for substantive changes.
While this skepticism caused difficulties, at the conclusion of the Confer-
ence, thirty-five of these forty-one new states voted for the final text to
make a total of 79 in favor, 1 against and 19 abstentions. 7 The new states
firmly believe that here is a convention codifying international law in which
their participation was a significant factor.
A third auspice pointing to the future importance of the Convention is
that the Convention itself looks to the future.
Article 4 provides that the Convention "applies only to treaties which
are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Con-
vention with regard to such States." The genesis of this provision is
interesting.
Article 4, unlike almost all of the clauses of the Convention, is not based
upon a draft article produced by the International Law Commission. The
article was not introduced or discussed in the 1968 sessions of the Confer-
ence, and the second session in 1969 was almost half over before a
provision on the non-retroactivity of the Convention was formally in-
troduced.8
During the first session of the Conference it became clear that a number
of delegations were seeking amendments that would assist in reopening
disputes previously settled by treaty or which would bolster one or the
61 Analytical Compilation of Comments and Observations Made in 1966 and 1967 with
Respect to the Final Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/5
(Vol. 1) (1968).7 Provisional Summary Record of the Thirty-Sixth Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/SR.36, at 14- 15.
8 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/C.I/L.399, April 23, 1969.
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other side in existing disputes. For example, Cuba proposed an amendment
to article 56 on the denunciation of a treaty containing no provisions
regarding termination. In presenting the amendment the Cuban delegate
made no bones about its purpose. He stated that a lease of indefinite
duration of a portion of a country's territory was incompatible with the
principle of sovereignty. 9 If he had labelled his document "Amendment to
terminate the lease of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station" it might have
been a little more obvious, but not much.
The cumulative effect of proposals of this character was a major factor
in adoption of article 4. This turning of the Convention toward the future
may delay its effectiveness in the short run. In the long run much will be
gained from barring the difficulties that would result from using a new
formulation to resurrect old quarrels.
While these aspects support a degree of optimism on the future of the
Treaties Convention, they remain peripheral. The key question is the total
effect of the eighty-five articles that make up the Convention. Is this a
treaty for all seasons?
An answer is complicated by the range of subject matter. The Con-
vention is a composite of topics varying from the practicalities of how to
correct an error in a treaty to the metaphysics of jus cogens. It has more
variety possibly than Antony found in Cleopatra. Nonetheless, there are
unifying features.
Throughout all the articles there is a disinterest in formality for the sake
of formality. A clear reflection of this approach is article 11 on Means of
expressing consent to be bound:
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by
signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, accep-
tance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.
This article disposes of the long-standing feud between the proponents
of signature and the adherents of ratification as the proper way to enter into
a treaty, by ignoring the issue. This position did not result from oversight,
as the opposing pundits argued their positions at length in Vienna.' 0 The
decision to jettison the doctrinal dispute in favor of the will of the parties is
a tribute to the common sense of the informal approach.
Article 11 also illustrates another unifying aspect of the Conven-
tion-the latitude given to the parties to select methods or procedures
best suited to their needs. A great many of the articles in the Convention
9United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties: First Session: Vienna, 26 March-24
May 1968: Official Records. Summary records of the Plenary meetings and of the meetings of
the Committee of the Whole, 337 (para. 23). U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/1I [Hereinafter cited as
Official Records: First Session].
lid., 85-91.
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are devoted to the mechanics of treaty-making. There is a series of rules
that lay down requirements for full powers, for adoption and authentication
of a text, the different ways to express consent to be bound, entry into
force, territorial scope, application of successive treaties relating to the
same subject matter, amendment, modification of multilateral treaties, the
duties of depositaries and other matters in abundant profusion. These
technical articles are, almost without exception, well worked out and
should be simple and effective in application. A striking feature is that,
almost without exception, each article contains some such language as
"unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have other-
wise agreed."" The formulae vary according to subject matter, but the
result remains constant. These procedural rules are designed to help
treaty-makers, not to limit them.
A striking example of this permissive approach is in a section with
considerable substantive content, that on reservations. The Convention
discards the classical contracts theory of international agreements under
which a state making a reservation to a multilateral treaty was considered
as making a counter-offer that required acceptance by all other parties. The
basic rule on reservations in article 19 excludes only a reservation prohib-
ited by the treaty concerned, either expressly or by necessary implication,
and a reservation "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty."
This is, of course, a full embrace of the principle announced by the
International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to
the Genocide Convention.' 2
Article 20 details procedures for handling reservations. The rules laid
down derive from the General Assembly instructions that the United
Nations Secretariat should not comment on the effect of the reservations,
but allow each state to draw its own view of the legal consequences.' 3 In
most cases under article 20 if a state does not decline to enter into treaty
relations with a reserving state within twelve months of notification of the
reservation, there is automatic establishment of treaty relations with the
reserving state.
While this may not be a carte blanche on reservations, it is at least a
carte grise.
Despite this pervasive permissiveness, there is a substantial number of
articles where a strict rule is both necessary and desirable. Some articles
by their nature permit no degree of tolerance. Article 26 says that every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in
good faith. It would be possible to water down this requirement, and such
"E.g., articles 15, 16, 17, 22(3), 29, 78.
12[19511 I.C.J. 15.
"3G.A. Res. 598 (VI) Supp. 20 at 84. U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1957).
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attempts were made, but the result would not have been the rule of pacta
sunt servanda.
The articles in which no tolerance is permitted are principally those
directed toward what might be called problems of fairness. A simple
example is in article 35 which provides that an obligation can arise for a
state not party to a treaty from a provision in a treaty only if the third state
expressly accepts the obligation in writing. The basic legal principle in-
volved is of considerable antiquity. What has been added is the inflexible
procedural requirement of express acceptance in writing to insure that an
unwary state doesn't find itself saddled with a treaty obligation without
opportunity for adequate consideration. On the other hand, in article 36 on
rights for third states arising out of treaty provisions, this balancing of
equities resulted in a presumption that the third state intends to enjoy such
a right in the absence of indication to the contrary. The theory in the article
36 case is that the third states can obtain benefits.
The demand for rules on fair dealing did, however, raise conflicts with
the imperative of assuring basic stability in the treaty system. Sir Arthur
Bryant remarks of Europe in the Tenth Century1 4 that the problem of the
Dark Ages was to make any system of government work except that of
force. The solution at the time turned out to be feudalism, a system which
was highly inefficient, unwieldy, unjust, and often unbearable. But it did
provide a measure of security, a degree of order, and a climate for growth.
The stability of that system was a matter of great moment for centuries.
What the feudal system was to Europe in the Dark Ages the treaty
system is to us in this age, which, if not dark, could at least be called the
Ominous Era. The treaty system is what we have for our international
needs. Fortunately, it works, far from perfectly perhaps, but not too badly
in a world that at the end of the second millennium is as filled with
conflicting sovereignties as Europe in the last centuries of the first millen-
nium was filled with fighting war-bands. The stability of the treaties system
is necessarily a matter of great moment for this and coming centuries.
Concern for stability was focused particularly on Part V of the Con-
vention on the validity, termination and suspension of treaties. The articles
on invalidity in Part V provide that a treaty may be set aside if consent was
induced by error' 5 or by fraud, 16 threat or use of force,' 7 if the consent
manifestly violated a fundamentally important rule of the state's internal
law,' 8 if the state's representative exceeded specific restrictions upon his






International Lawyer, Vol. 4. No. 5
The Future Law of Treaties
authority that had been notified to the other negotiating states,19 or if the
treaty, when concluded, conflicted with a peremptory norm of international
law.20 From the standpoint of private law, this is perhaps a minimal list of
requirements regarding the essential validity of contracts. In public in-
ternational law, it is to be the maximum list. Article 42 says, in effect, that
the validity of a treaty may be impeached only through the application of
one or more of these rules.
This requirement is designed to protect the stability of the treaties
structure by fixing the grounds for claims that a treaty is not valid and
barring claims based on any other ground. The International Law Commis-
sion in putting the list together found that there was little international
practice upon which to rely.21 There is no international jurisprudence, for
example, with respect to cases of fraud, corruption of a state's representa-
tive and coercion of a state's representative. There is relatively little with
regard to error.22 One consequence was that the International Law Com-
mission in preparing drafts of these articles used very broad language.
For example, article 50 provides that a treaty procured... "through the
corruption of [a State's] representative directly or indirectly by another
negotiating State" invalidates the consent to be bound by the treaty. There
is no definition of corruption in the Convention. There is no published state
practice that can be referred to in interpreting article 50.
The vagueness of the test makes it, and related articles, susceptible to
misuse by states that wish to escape from treaty obligations that no longer
suit national interest or convenience. Consequently we and other states
opposed to weakening the effect of pacta sunt servanda attempted in
Vienna to strengthen those articles by tighter definition of the conduct
supporting a claim of invalidity.23 A degree of success was achieved but it
was limited, largely because delegations from the former colonies thought
that there had been fraud and corruption and coercion and use of force in
the era of colonization and they were determined that such practices
should be stricken down in the era of decolonization. The reality of these
abuses cannot be denied and, in view of the past, the determination to
avoid any complicated legal constructions that might take back in one
phrase what they appear to grant in another, can be understood.
The articles produced by the Commission and adopted by the Confer-
'
9 A'rticle 47.2 0Article 53.
2 1 1nt'l. L. Comm. Report 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 70, 73, 74 (1966).22The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, the Temple of Preah Vihear, and the Read-
aptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concession cases (the last of which concerned a
concession rather than a treaty) are cited in the Commission's commentary. Id., 72-7 3.
=Official Records, First Session, 238-295 (passim).
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ence contain a number of means to balance the need for stability and the
demand for rules of fair dealing. One of these is article 44 which recognizes
a severability principle when the claim of invalidity relates only to a
particular clause or clauses. Article 45 offers a considerable barrier to
abuse. If, after becoming aware of the facts, a state expressly agrees a
treaty is valid or by reason of its conduct must be considered to have
acquiesced in its validity then it loses its right to make the claim.
Neither of these articles applies to cases of coercion or conflict with
peremptory norms of general international law. As to the coercion cases,
the motive for exclusion is that imposition of a treaty by force vitiates the
consensual element. There is an aspect of retribution in this provision.
With respect to peremptory norms, orjus cogens, the objection is a logical
necessity. If international law flatly prohibits parties from entering into a
certain type of treaty and declares such treaties void then those parties
cannot escape the prohibition by engaging in acts indicating defiance of the
prohibition.
Article 53 on jus cogens was the most abstract issue dealt with in
Vienna. It poses a simple moral question-can a state agree with another
state to do anything the two want, such as invading a third state and selling
its inhabitants as slaves. The simple moral answer is no but then comes the
difficult task-how to define this moral principle as a legal limitation upon
state action. The Commission described the limitation as a peremptory
norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted so
that a treaty violating the norm is void. This is scarcely as blinding an
illumination as that which engulfed Saul on his way to Damascus. 2 4 States
concerned with treaty stability in Vienna considered the lack of definition
dangerous.25 Many ex-colonies, however, considered this article in its
pristine form the brightest gem in the Convention26 and a pitched battle
ensued over its amendment. The outcome was addition of a requirement
that the norm must be "accepted and recognized by the international
community as a whole."
Despite this substantial improvement concern remained high over the
possible effect upon treaty stability of this and the other invalidity articles
as well as a few other provisions such as article 62 on Fundamental change
of circumstances. The embodiment of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine
differs from the invalidity articles in being more tightly drafted. One ex-
24Acts 9:3-7.
2See, in particular, the statements in support of the amendments proposed by Finland,
Greece, and Spain, and by the United States. Official Records, First Session, 293-334
(passim).26A member of the Indian Delegation described the Commission's text as "a masterpiece
of precision and simplicity .... " Official Records,-First Session, 307.
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ample is that there is a flat prohibition on using fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty
that fixes a boundary.2 7 Another is that the fundamental change of circum-
stances must radically transform the extent of the obligation remaining to
be performed. 28 There was a fair amount of state practice regarding rebus
sic stantibus which undoubtedly aided in establishing reasonably narrow
parameters for the operation of the doctri'ne.
At the heart of the concern whether the provisions were sacrificing
stability by overemphasizing fairness, was the failure of the Commission to
include in its draft articles adequate provision for the impartial review of
claims that a treaty obligation was no longer binding.
The Commission's original procedural proposal is embodied in article 65
of the Convention. A party to a treaty that claims a right to terminate the
treaty because, for example, of a fundamental change of circumstances, or
a material breach, must notify the other party or parties of the claim, the
basis therefor, and what action it is proposing to take. If the other party or
parties fail to object within three months of receiving the notification
(although a shorter period could be specified in cases of special urgency),
the complaining party can proceed with the termination. If another party to
the treaty objects to the proposed action, article 65 says the parties shall
seek a solution through the means indicated in article 33 of the United
Nations Charter. And Charter article 33, in brief, leaves to the parties the
selection of the means through which they are to endeavor to resolve their
dispute.29
A good many countries, including the United States, were concerned
that nations seeking to avoid treaty obligations would claim the only real
requirement was a three-months' waiting period. Thereafter, a party might
assert the right to terminate or withdraw from a treaty on the basis that
recourse to article 33 of the Charter had not resulted in an agreed set-
tlement.
The Commission's failure to propose a procedure that guarded against
misuse of the termination and invalidity articles reflects a variety of opposi-
tions to procedures for impartial settlement of disputes. One source was
the shock and dismay touched off in many developing states by the final
decision of the International Court of Justice in the South West Africa
case.30 Another was the long-fixed ideological opposition of the Soviet
27Para. 2 (a).28Para. I (b).29Paragraph I of article 33 lists a number of means of pacific settlement of disputes which
the parties may employ: "negotiation enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice."
3
°South West Africa, Second Phase [1966] I.C.J. 6.
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Union and other Communist states to third-party settlement of interna-
tional disputes. Another was the substantial antipathy in a number of
societies to recourse to judicial methods for settlement of disputes. 3 ' An-
other was the continuing distrust of ex-colonies of recourse to institutions
and procedures that they had not participated in developing.
These same factors coalesced at the Vienna Conference into a formi-
dable obstacle to strengthening the dubious protection of article 65. The
struggle over this question became the key issue of the Conference. A
spectrum of amendments was submitted, ranging from mandatory jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice over any dispute arising out of the
application of the Convention 32 to facilitating access to the Security Coun-
cil with respect to such disputes.33 The only proposal with substantial
support was for a two-step procedure: first, conciliation; if that failed,
arbitration at the request of any party to the dispute. 34
It became obvious during the 1968 session in Vienna that a generally
acceptable solution for the disputes-settlement question was essential if the
Treaties Convention was to be widely accepted. Decision on the varying
amendments was postponed to the 1969 session. During the interval be-
tween the sessions, the United States conducted a world-wide campaign in
support of the conciliation-arbitration proposal.
These and similar efforts converted a majority opposition to third-party
disputes settlement in 1968 into an approval of the conciliation-arbitration
amendment in 1969 by the Committee of the Whole with a 54 to 34 vote
with 14 abstentions. 35 For adoption in the plenary meeting, however, a
two-thirds majority was necessary. By Herculean efforts, eight additional
affirmative votes were obtained but the opposing forces acquired three
additional negative votes and the amendment was defeated.36
The defeat was followed by a series of 'round the clock private meetings
to find a compromise solution. In the afternoon of the final working day of
the session, part of the Asian-African group put forward a last-ditch pro-
posal on a take-it or leave-it basis. The Conference took it. The amend-
ment was adopted by 61 to 20 with 26 abstentions. 37 The proposal had two
aspects. If the dispute over a treaty involved the application or inter-
pretation of the jus cogens principle the dispute would be subject to the
mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 38
31See R. DAVID and J.E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY,
442, 463 (1968).32U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/L.347 (1968) (Switzerland).
33 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/C.1/L.343 (1968) (Uruguay).34 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/C.I/L.352 and Rev. 1 (1968).
35 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/C.I/SR.99, at 8 (1969).
36 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/SR.27, at 8 (1969).3 7U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/SR.34, at 27 (1969).3 8Article 66 (a).
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Any other dispute regarding the invalidity, termination, or suspension of
a treaty could be taken by any party to a conciliation commission of five
jurists.3 9
The provisions regarding conciliation are set forth in the Annex to the
Convention and it is made clear there that the findings and conclusions of
the conciliation commission are recommendations to the parties in order to
facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute rather than a binding deci-
sion. If the conciliation procedure were actually confined to this sort of
"good offices" role, there would be a serious question whether the require-
ment had been met for an impartial third-party decision on the merits of a
claim to be relieved of a treaty obligation.
The procedure in the Annex, however, goes considerably beyond mere
"good offices." The key provisions require a conciliation commission to
"hear the parties, examine the claims and objections and make proposals to
the parties with a view to reaching an amicable settlement." 40 The Com-
mission is required to make a report within twelve months of its estab-
lishment and the report may set forth conclusions regarding the facts and
questions of law. This report is to be deposited with the Secretary General
of the United Nations and also transmitted to the parties to the dispute. 41
Viewing the provisions of the Annex as a whole it is reasonably clear
that a conciliation commission is to conduct itself as a tribunal and is to
deal with the factual and legal issues before it by a process of hearing and
adjudication. For a conciliation commission to do its assigned work, it will
have to examine the factual basis of claims and the objections to those
claims, establish what the facts are and draw the legal conclusions that
arise from those facts. The report to be submitted should thus be substan-
tially in the nature of an advisory opinion.
Although such a report is not in itself binding upon the parties, this is not
to say that the report is without legal effect. It must be borne in mind that
the Convention does not confer a right upon a party to terminate a treaty if
an objection has been made to the ground of termination. The Convention,
in its draft form, and this was the basis for our concern, didn't say yes and
didn't say no on what are the rights of the parties after recourse to, in
Charter language, "peaceful settlement."
Now if a state makes a claim of invalidity and a conciliation commission
after due examination and deliberation finds the claim well supported in
fact and in law, this supplies a substantial basis for the complaining state to
take action terminating or suspending that treaty. On the other hand, if a
conciliation commission finds that the claim is not supported in fact or in
39Article 66 (b).
4
°Annex, para. 5.411d., para. 6.
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law then the situation is that the basis for the complaining state to take the
action it proposed has not been established. Under the principle of pacta
sunt servanda there would remain an obligation to continue performance
under the treaty.
The last-minute compromise, therefore, represents a real protection
against abuse of the Treaties Convention and a substantial safeguard
against assaults upon the treaty structure. The assignment of jus cogens
issues to the International Court is an important contribution to the devel-
opment of international law. The conciliation commission is the first man-
datory disputes-settlement procedure to be incorporated-in a treaty of this
fundamental character. The compromise is the key which permits us to
open the door to the future of treaty law.
In these last decades of the Twentieth Century we can not merely cling
to the past. The Convention could not be merely a compilation of rules on
treaty technique. It had to recognize and provide for reconciling the need
of a changing world community for peaceful change with the imperative of
not wrecking that community's "only and sadly overworked instrument"
for making change.
The treaty on treaties has achieved this precarious balance, though
perhaps not in the most neat and tidy of fashions. Warts and all, the
Convention is a significant contribution to the international advancement of
the rule of law. As a fitting prelude to the opening of the third millennium it
merits our support.
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